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1. Background 
 
AIDS is one of the most devastating illnesses the world has ever faced. Since the disease was first 
reported in 1981, more than 60 million people have been infected and around 20 million have died. 
At the end of 2006, 40 million people were HIV-positive (25 million of them in Sub-Saharan Africa,1 
most of whom do not have access to the anti-retroviral drugs which have contained the disease in the 
developed world). Yet, scientists are almost no closer to producing a vaccine against HIV infection 
than in the 1980s. The main ray of hope for developing a vaccine was provided by “the Nairobi 
prostitutes”, as they have become known amongst AIDS experts.2 3 These women, a group of 
commercial sex workers from a slum called Majengo in Nairobi’s Pumwani District, have attracted 
the attention of the international community since the early 1990s. 
 
In the late 1980s, Canadian infectious disease-scientist Francis Plummer first noticed4 something 
perplexing amongst a group of 2,000 Nairobi prostitutes enrolled in a study regarding sexually 
transmitted diseases (STDs).5 Approximately 5% of these women had repeatedly tested negative for 
HIV infection, despite their high-risk behaviour;6 according to the research team, some of the women 
had experienced hundreds of unprotected exposures to the AIDS virus over a decade without 
showing any signs of HIV infection.7  
 
 
At forty-one, Hala has five children and eight grandchildren. Her first husband left when 
their second child was born. Her second husband died of aids nearly twenty years ago, in the 
earliest days of the epidemic. Hala often tells people that she sells charcoal, doughnuts, or 
cooking oil on the streets, but that isn't true. She is a prostitute, who has spent nearly half her 
life working out of a wattle hut in Pumwani, one of Nairobi's most crowded--and violent--
slums. On an average day, she might see ten men, most of them truck drivers from Tanzania. 
Her "office" has just enough room for a single bed, a stool, a customer, herself, and a wicker 
basket filled with condoms. The basket is a recent addition; only in the past year or so have 
her clients agreed to use condoms with any regularity…. In Pumwani, more than ninety per 
                                                 
1
 UNAIDS/WHO AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2006 http://data.unaids.org/pub/EpiReport/2006/02-
Global_Summary_2006_EpiUpdate_eng.pdf accessed July 5 2007. 
2
 The Associated Press, ‘Nairobi Prostitutes may hold key to AIDS Vaccine,’ CNN, 25 October 1997, 
http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9710/25/kenya.aids/index.html accessed 6 March 2007. 
3
 John Carlin, ‘Hope for Aids cure as prostitutes defy virus in the slums’, The Observer, November 23, 2003 
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/science/story/0,,1091375,00.html#article_continue accessed July 11 2007. 
4
 This phenomenon was first described by Frank Plummer at the 1993 International AIDS conference in Berlin. Lawrence 
K Altman, ‘HIV Immunity Discussed at Berlin Conference,’ New York Times, June 9, 1993 available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE0DB1F3FF93AA35755C0A965958260&sec=health&spon=&pag
ewanted=print accessed 10 July 2007. 
5
 The cohort of female sex workers was established by Elizabeth Ngugi and colleagues from the University of Nairobi 
and the University of Manitoba, see Richard Jeffreys, ‘Riddle Women: Reports of Progress Toward Understanding How 
Some People Appear to Fight Off HIV,’ at www.thebody.com/content/art1571.html  accessed July 9 2007.   
6
 Hilary Bower, ‘Science:  New hope; African prostitutes who seem to have developed immunity to HIV have pointed an 
Oxford research team in the direction of a vaccine – and not only for the prosperous,’ The Independent (London) 
November 29 1998. 
7
 Anne-christine d'Adesky and Richard Jeffreys, ‘The African Connection. Sex workers provide clues for a vaccine,’ 
HIV+ 3, March 1999 available at http://www.aidsinfonyc.org/hivplus/issue3/ahead/african.html    accessed 10 July 2007. 
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cent of prostitutes--and many of their clients--test positive for the virus. Hala has engaged in 
unprotected sex with hundreds of HIV-positive men. … Remarkably, though, she has never 
become infected. 8 
 
Since 1998 researchers from the universities of Oxford, Nairobi, and Manitoba have been 
collaborating on a project to develop a vaccine against HIV based on the immunological protection 
mechanisms found in these sex workers.  The partnership includes the UK Medical Research 
Council; the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI)9 and the Uganda Virus Research Institute. 
 
An early study which followed 424 sex workers between 1985 and 1994, established that a small 
proportion of highly exposed individuals have a natural protective immunity, which means they are 
resistant to HIV infection.10 
 
Subsequent studies aimed to clarify the nature of the women’s immune response as this “has 
significant implications for vaccine design”.11 What was it about the women’s immune response that 
was so successful it made them resistant to HIV? A 1998 study did not find conclusive answers, but 
did establish that in contrast to research conducted amongst Caucasian populations, the Nairobi 
women’s resistance could not be accounted for by various mechanisms suggested so far.12 
 
An immunological evaluation in a further study established that the HIV resistant women possessed 
high levels of a type of white blood cell known as cytotoxic T lymphocytes, or killer T-cells, which 
showed an HIV-1 specific response.  The women’s killer T-cells were able to quickly target 
particular proteins produced by the HIV virus, before the virus could take hold, which protected them 
against HIV-1 infection.13  This provided the researchers with a new understanding, on which 
subsequent vaccine development was based. 14 15 16 
                                                 
8
 Michael Specter, ‘The vaccine - Has the race to save Africa from aids put Western science at odds with Western 
ethics?’, The New Yorker, February 3, 2003 at: http://www.michaelspecter.com/ny/2003/2003_02_03_vaccine.html 
accessed 5 July 2007. 
9
 IAVI is a global not-for-profit, public-private partnership working to accelerate the development of a vaccine to prevent 
HIV infection and AIDS, founded in 1996 http://www.iavi.org/viewpage.cfm?aid=24  
10
 Fowke KR, Nagelkerke NJ, Kimani J, Simonsen JN, Anzala AO, Bwayo JJ, MacDonald KS, Ngugi EN, Plummer FA. 
‘Resistance to HIV-1 infection among persistently seronegative prostitutes in Nairobi, Kenya,’ Lancet 1996 Nov 16; 348 
(9038):1347-51. 
11
  Rowland-Jones SL, Dong T, Fowke KR, Kimani J, Krausa P, Newell H, Blanchard T, Ariyoshi K, Oyugi J, Ngugi E, 
Bwayo J, MacDonald KS, McMichael AJ, Plummer FA. ‘Cytotoxic T cell responses to multiple conserved HIV epitopes 
in HIV-resistant prostitutes in Nairobi,’ J Clin Invest. 1998 Nov 1; 102(9):1758-65. 
12
  Fowke KR, Dong T, Rowland-Jones SL, Oyugi J, Rutherford WJ, Kimani J, Krausa P, Bwayo J, Simonsen JN, Shearer 
GM, Plummer FA. ‘HIV type 1 resistance in Kenyan sex workers is not associated with altered cellular susceptibility to 
HIV type 1 infection or enhanced beta-chemokine production,’ AIDS Res Hum Retroviruses. 1998 Nov 20; 14(17):1521-
30. 
13
  Fowke KR, Kaul R, Rosenthal KL, Oyugi J, Kimani J, Rutherford WJ, Nagelkerke NJ, Ball TB, Bwayo JJ, Simonsen 
JN, Shearer GM, Plummer FA. ‘HIV-1-specific cellular immune responses among HIV-1-resistant sex workers,’ 
Immunol Cell Biol. 2000 Dec; 78 (6):586-95. 
14
 Bower, H, Ibid. 
15
 Rowland –Jones S, Dong T, Krausa P, Sutton J, Newell H, Ariyoshi K, Gotch F, Sabally S, Corrah T, Kimani J, 
MacDonald K, Plummer F, Ndinya-Achola J, Whittle H, McMichael A. ‘The role of cytotoxic T-cells in HIV infection,’  
Dev Biol Stand. 1998; 92:209-14. 
16
 Kaul R, Dong T, Plummer FA, Kimani J, Rostron T, Kiama P, Njagi E, Irungu E, Farah B, Oyugi J, Chakraborty R, 
MacDonald KS, Bwayo JJ, McMichael A, Rowland-Jones SL. ‘CD8(+) lymphocytes respond to different HIV epitopes in 
seronegative and infected subjects,’ J Clin Invest. 2001 May; 107(10):1303-10. 
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Vaccine trials started in 2001 and proceeded through clinical trials I and II.17 However, in 2004 it was 
announced by the Oxford/Nairobi team at an international AIDS-Vaccine conference in Switzerland 
that the vaccine had failed to offer sufficient protection against HIV infection. Initial analysis showed 
that although the vaccine was safe and well tolerated, only 20% of the volunteer participants had 
showed a potentially protective stimulated T-cell response after receiving the vaccine, and at a lower 
rate than desired.18 19 
 
A more recent study, conducted in Nairobi between 1996 - 2000, noted that eleven of the women 
who had been classified as HIV-1 resistant had seroconverted.20 This aroused concern, as well as 
scientific interest as to whether they had a waning immunity.21 A key finding in this study was that 
the women’s seroconversion was correlated with a reduction in sex work.  A break in sex work was 
associated with a loss of the immune responses which were protecting them against the HIV virus. 
The study therefore drew some important conclusions for vaccine development: 
 
 … HIV-1 resistance may not be an all-or-none phenomenon, but rather an immunologic 
state that is inducible given the correct antigenic stimulus. However, it also suggests that 
maintenance of HIV-1 immune resistance will require ongoing antigenic priming, either 
through intermittent vaccine boosters or through the use of vaccine strategies employing 
persistent antigen.22 23 
 
Thus attention shifted to the factors that led to seroconversion, and what could be learnt from this for 
vaccine development: 
 
These findings suggest that vaccine-induced protective HIV immunity is a realistic goal, but 
that vaccine strategies of boosting or persistent antigen may be necessary for long-lived 
protection.24 
 
                                                 
17
 Phase I trials are the earliest human tests in the life of a new drug.  They involve few people and check for safety, side 
effects and efficacy. This information is used to establish the dose which will be used in the next stage of testing.  Phase 2 
trials are carried out in larger groups of volunteers, to establish more about efficacy, dosage and side effects. 
18
 Arthur Okwemba, ‘AIDS Vaccine fails crucial test,’ Daily Nation, February 9 2004 available at 
http://www.nationmedia.com/daily nation/printpage.asp?newsid=14807 accessed 10 July 2007. 
19
 Michael Waldholz, ‘AIDS Vaccine Disappoints in Tests: Experimental Drug Failed To Show Robust Response in 
Human Immune System,’ Wall Street Journal, September 3, 2004 available at 
http://www.aegis.com/news/wsj/2004/WJ040901.html accessed 11 July 2007. 
20
 After initial exposure to any agent, it takes time for antibodies to develop.  At some point after initial HIV infection 
seroconversion occurs (usually this takes a few weeks to a few months): this means there is now a detectable level of 
antibodies to HIV in the blood, and a person will test (sero)positive for HIV. 
21
  Kaul R, Rowland-Jones SL, Kimani J, Dong T, Yang HB, Kiama P, Rostron T, Njagi E, Bwayo JJ, MacDonald KS, 
McMichael AJ, Plummer FA. ‘Late seroconversion in HIV-resistant Nairobi prostitutes despite pre-existing HIV-specific 
CD8+ responses,’ J Clin Invest. 2001 Feb; 107 (3):341-9. 
22
 Ibid., note 5, p.348. 
23
 An antigen is a substance (in this case the HIV virus) that stimulates an immune response. 
24
  Kaul R, Rowland-Jones SL, Kimani J, Fowke K, Dong T, Kiama P, Rutherford J, Njagi E, Mwangi F, Rostron T, 
Onyango J, Oyugi J, MacDonald KS, Bwayo JJ, Plummer FA. ‘New insights into HIV-1 specific cytotoxic T-lymphocyte 
responses in exposed, persistently seronegative Kenyan sex workers,’ Immunol Lett. 2001 Nov 1;79(1-2):3-13, p.3 
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Studies have subsequently been conducted on the long-term survivors which have suggested new 
directions in HIV research:  
 
Studying the interaction among immunogenetics, immune responses and viral sequences 
from all HIV-1 subtypes may increase our understanding of slow HIV-1 disease 
progression.25  
 
Other studies, which used the women’s genetic samples, have focused on genetic variation in order to 
determine susceptibility to HIV-1 infection.26 Genetic studies have provided new insights with regard 
to the factors associated with resistance to infection by HIV-127 and more studies are underway, 
which could contribute to the development of a vaccine against HIV. 
 
Follow up studies of 850 women in Majengo are currently being conducted as part of the ongoing 
collaborative project by researchers from the universities of Nairobi, Oxford and Manitoba. 
 
This report is concerned with the issue of benefit sharing with the participants in these studies.  
Having outlined the scientific background to the case, it goes on to describe the legal and institutional 
environment in which both the studies, and  the question of benefit sharing, take place.  It then 
examines the negotiating and decision-making procedures involved, and goes on to outline the most 
significant ethical issues raised, focussing on negotiation and consent, vulnerability and benefit 
sharing.  It concludes by identifying ways forward to develop benefit sharing models in cases of 
human genetic research. 
 
11. Legal and Institutional Environment 
 
11. 1. International Laws and Regulations 
  
Research involving human subjects is bound by the Declaration of Helsinki,28 and the CIOMS 
Guidelines.29  These do not have independent legal standing, but constitute the most authoritative 
statements on medical ethics, influencing the formulation of international, regional and national 
                                                 
25
 Fang G, Kuiken C, Weiser B, Rowland-Jones S, Plummer F, Chen CH, Kaul R, Anzala AO, Bwayo J, Kimani J, 
Philpott SM, Kitchen C, Sinsheimer JS, Gaschen B, Lang D, Shi B, Kemal KS, Rostron T, Brunner C, Beddows S, 
Sattenau Q, Paxinos E, Oyugi J, Burger H. ‘Long-term survivors in Nairobi: complete HIV-1 RNA sequences and 
immunogenetic associations,’ J Infect Dis. 2004 Aug 15; 190(4):697-701. Epub 2004 Jul 13. p.697. 
26
  Ji H, Ball TB, Kimani J, Plummer FA. ‘Novel interferon regulatory factor-1 polymorphisms in a Kenyan population 
revealed by complete gene sequencing,’ J Hum Genet. 2004; 49(10):528-35. Epub 2004 Sep 17. 
27
  For example; “This study adds IRF-1, a transcriptional immunoregulatory gene, to the list of genetic correlates of 
altered susceptibility to HIV-1. This is the first report suggesting that a viral transcriptional regulator might contribute to 
resistance to HIV-1”: Ball TB, Ji H, Kimani J, McLaren P, Marlin C, Hill AV, Plummer FA. ‘Polymorphisms in IRF-1 
associated with resistance to HIV-1 infection in highly exposed uninfected Kenyan sex workers,’ AIDS. 2007 May 31; 21 
(9):1091-1101. p. 1091. 
28
 World Medical Association, Helsinki Declaration, 2000. http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm    
 “The Declaration of Helsinki, issued by the World Medical Association in 1964, is the fundamental document in the 
field of ethics in biomedical research and has influenced the formulation of international, regional and national legislation 
and codes of conduct,” Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), International Ethical 
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, “International Instruments and Guidelines,” 
http://www.cioms.ch/frame_guidelines_nov_2002.htm accessed July 20 2007. 
29
 CIOMS, International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects. 
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legislation.  Both however, only refer to benefits for trial participants in terms of post-trial 
obligations, regarding for example, availability of treatments.30  
 
Most international legal instruments on benefit sharing govern access to and use of non-human 
genetic resources rather than human genetic resources.  The lack of a binding international legal 
framework regarding human genetic resources has not previously generated much concern.31  
 
The most important international legal instrument of relevance here is the 1976 International 
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  As one of the principal human 
rights treaties, this provides “that States parties to the covenant recognise the right of everyone to 
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications”.32 Although this “rather indefinite” 33 
provision can be generally applied to the question of access to benefits derived from scientific 
activity involving human genetic resources, it does not contain any clear guidance as to what this 
might actually mean in practice. 
 
The current situation is therefore that each state is responsible for putting its own legal framework in 
place to govern the use of human genetic resources, but, subject to international standards in medical 
ethics, this is largely in the context of international guidelines rather than laws. 
 
 
11. ii International Guidelines 
 
UNESCO has issued a variety of Declarations relating to genomics, bioethics and human rights, all 
of which demonstrate a particular concern with regard to developing countries.  None of these are 
legally binding, but again they provide important guidelines for states in the formulation of their 
legislation and policies. 
 
In 1997 UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights stated that 
“Benefits from advances in biology, genetics and medicine, concerning the human genome, shall be 
made available to all, with due regard for the dignity and human rights of each individual,”34 and that 
“developing countries [are] to benefit from the achievements of scientific and technological research 
so that their use in favour of economic and social progress can be to the benefit of all”.35 
 
                                                 
30
 Helsinki Declaration, Principle 30.  CIOMS Guidelines, Guideline 10: “any intervention or product developed, or 
knowledge generated, will be made reasonably available for the benefit of that population or community”. 
31
 See Lorraine Sheremeta, ‘Population Genetic Studies: Is there an Emerging Legal Obligation to Share Benefits?’ 
Health Law Review 12/1 (2003) 36-38. See Kadri Simm, Benefit Sharing Frameworks – Justifications for and against 
benefit sharing in human genetic research.  A Report for Genbenefit, available at www.uclan.ac.uk/genbenefit  See also 
discussion on HUGO Statement on Benefit Sharing below. 
32
 United Nations, International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1976, Article 15(1) (b) 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm accessed 21 February 2007. 
33
 See Kadri Simm, Benefit Sharing Frameworks – Justifications for and against benefit sharing in human genetic 
research, p.4. 
34
 UNESCO, Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 1997, (article 12(a) ) 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13177&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html accessed 13 
July 2007. 
35
 Ibid., article 19(a), iii. 
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In 2003 UNESCO’s International Declaration on Human Genetic Data expanded on this general 
notion of the sharing of benefits.  Article 19 states that benefits “resulting from the use of human 
genetic data…..should be shared with the society as a whole and the international community”.36  
 
UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005) emphasizes the need “to 
promote equitable access to medical, scientific and technological developments as well as the 
greatest possible flow and the rapid sharing of knowledge concerning those developments and the 
sharing of benefits, with particular attention to the needs of developing countries.”37 In line with the 
scope of this Declaration, Article 15 stipulates: 
 
1. Benefits resulting from any scientific research and its applications should be shared with 
society as a whole and within the international community, in particular with developing 
countries. In giving effect to this principle, benefits may take any of the following forms:  
 
The clearest identification of benefit sharing regarding human genetics so far has been made in the 
Human Genome Organisation (HUGO) Ethics Committee Statement on Benefit-Sharing.38  Noting 
that “benefit-sharing has also been established as a principle of international law in the area of 
biodiversity and genetic resources in food and agriculture” the Statement focuses mainly on the 
distribution of “goods that contribute to well-being” that might arise from human genetic research, 
based on the participation of different communities. In addition to recommending “that all humanity 
share in the benefits of genetic research” the Statement recommends “that benefits not be limited to 
those who have participated in such research”, “and that there be prior discussion with groups or 
communities on the issue of benefit-sharing.”  The Statement both defines and contextualises the 
concepts it draws upon, such as community and justice, and therefore makes its recommendations in 
a clear context of how these goals might (start to be) achieved.  For these reasons it has been well-
received in the world of human genetics, where it is proving to be a powerful rhetorical tool. 39 
 
The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) Ethical Considerations in HIV 
Preventive Vaccine Research,40 is another authoritative ethical statement relevant to this case.  
Guidance Point 10 stipulates clearly what may be considered to be minimum benefits for participants 
in HIV preventive vaccine trials in terms of health care. These are: regular and supportive contact 
with health care workers and counsellors throughout the course of the trial; comprehensive 
information regarding HIV transmission and how it can be prevented; access to HIV prevention 
methods; access to a pre-agreed care and treatment package for HIV/AIDS if they become HIV 
infected while enrolled in the trial; compensation for time, travel and inconvenience for participation 
in the trials; if the vaccine is effective, they will also develop protective immunity to HIV. Notably 
however, these are not, strictly speaking, benefits that are derived from the research, which could 
                                                 
36
 UNESCO, International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, 2003, Article 1, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=17720&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html accessed 21 February 2007. 
37
 UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 2005, Article 2 (f). 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31058&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
38
 HUGO Ethics Committee, Statement on Benefit-Sharing, (April 9 2000), section G. Benefit Sharing, available from 
http://www.hugo-international.org/Statement _on_Benefit_Sharing.htm accessed 13 July 2007. 
39
 See Kadri Simm, Benefit Sharing Frameworks, esp. pp 4-5. 
40
 UNAIDS, The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) - Ethical Considerations in HIV Preventive 
Vaccine Research, Geneva, May 2000, Switzerland. http://www.unaids.org/html/pub/publications/irc-pub01/jc072-
ethicalcons_en_pdf.pdf accessed 17 July 2007. 
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then be shared with the participants, but simply benefits, which may be derived from participating in 
vaccine research, in line with current agreed international standards of conduct in medical research.  
Most of these ‘benefits’ have been, and continue to be, available to the women in the Majengo 
studies.41 
 
However, like the UNESCO Declarations and the HUGO Statement, the UNAIDS guidance has no 
legal status. The relevance of these, and other guidelines for the ethical issues arising from the 
Majengo case are discussed later in this report. 
 
 
 
11. iii. National Laws, Regulations and Institutions 
 
Although Kenya has put regulations in place to govern access to non-human genetic resources and 
subsequent benefit sharing, currently no such policy or regulations exist for the use of human genetic 
resources.42  The existing regulations were made pursuant to section 147 of the Environmental 
Management and Co-ordination Act, 1999.43 Interestingly, genetic material is defined in Clause 2 of 
these regulations as “any genetic material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing 
functional units of heredity”. This definition could arguably have been extended to apply to human 
genetic resources, but Clause 3(c) expressly excludes the application of the regulations to human 
genetic resources.44 
 
Kenya has also developed National Guidelines for Research and Development of HIV/AIDS Vaccines 
to provide a framework for developing and evaluating HIV/AIDS vaccines in the country. These 
Guidelines are highly relevant for this report given that the Majengo studies have contributed to 
HIV/AIDS vaccine research and development, although the women themselves have not been 
involved in the vaccine trials. The Guidelines “provide a blueprint for government agencies and non-
governmental organizations to collaborate with HIV/AIDS vaccine research and development 
partners to accelerate the research and development.”45 
 
The Guidelines also provide an enabling framework for addressing issues of financial compensation. 
Paragraph 8.3 provides as follows: 
 
Material transfer agreements should state: 
– The materials or specimens are for scientific, educational and non-commercial purposes only. 
                                                 
41
  This was confirmed by an interview with a Nairobi University Researcher, as well as interviews with some of the 
Majengo participants. It is important to note that this has been a major factor in the women’s (continuing) involvement; “I 
expected treatment, free of charge.  Every time I fall sick I come here for treatment and it’s free.”; “It is their treatment, 
they give us free medicine because of the nature of our work”. GenBenefit, April 2007. 
42
 Interview with Ministry of Health (MoH), Kenya, GenBenefit April 2007. 
43
 The Environmental Management and Co-ordination (Conservation of Biological Diversity and Resources, Access to 
Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing) Regulations, 2006, issued under Legal Notice No 160. 
44
 The Kenyan Ministry of Health is currently (April 2007) convening a taskforce to formulate a legal framework for the 
conduct of such research and related matters, with the emphasis on public protection.  Interview with MoH, GenBenefit, 
April 2007. 
45
 Ministry of Health. Kenya National Guidelines for Research and Development of HIV/AIDS Vaccines, March 2005, 
p.vi. 
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– Any other use of materials and specimens or research results, including but not limited to 
commercial development, may proceed only after concluding a cooperative research and 
development agreement (RADA). Negotiations must be completed and the RADA executed 
before commercial sale of the products. This agreement must be binding on all parties with 
respect to intellectual property rights. 
– Any unauthorised commercial use of the materials and specimens or results without the said 
agreement will be subject to financial penalty by court of law. 
– No material transfer will be done without the consent of the trial participant. 
– No material transfer will be done without approval of the protocol and in accordance to the 
Ministry of Health guidelines on transfer of biological material. 
 
Benefit sharing agreements could effectively be incorporated into the cooperative RADA. The 
agreements would then be binding and enforceable in law. 
 
 Interestingly, the preface to the Guidelines notes that they were developed in response to the 
Majengo case, which represented the beginning of the search for an HIV/AIDS vaccine in Kenya. 
They thereby filled a gap, given that prior to this, “there were no clear and specific guidelines to aid 
in developing and evaluating HIV/AIDS vaccines”.46 A consensus workshop was held in 2004 during 
which stakeholders’ views were incorporated into the Guidelines. The consultation process has not 
yet been completed and the Ministry of Health is still open to receiving comments and suggestions.  
 
 
111.  Negotiation and decision making 
 
In the Majengo case, the original, routine issues of negotiation and decision-making related to the 
conduct of the research studies only involved researchers and administrators from the relevant 
universities and institutions. Concerns have been expressed in Kenya about the difficulties of 
equitable collaborations between Kenyan researchers and those from Europe and elsewhere – this 
problem links to the alleged patent dispute between Oxford and Nairobi mentioned below, but also to 
wider issues.  It is a particular concern in Kenya, given that “A lot of requests for genetic research are 
coming from outside countries from collaborators. There is very little local genetic research.  Most of 
it is collaborative.”47  
 
There was no formal inclusion of representatives from the sex workers in any of these negotiations. 
The volunteer (sex worker) participants themselves have at all stages given consent to their 
participation in the studies,48 but as is standard practice in scientific research, they have retained no 
right of ownership over any donated samples or knowledge accrued from those, and therefore no 
negotiating rights regarding any subsequent developments. 
 
                                                 
46
 Ibid., p.vii.  
47
 Interview with KEMRI, GenBenefit, April 2007. 
48
 Issues have been raised concerning the difficulties of communicating adequate information for obtaining meaningful 
consent from potential participants given the difficulties of translating complex concepts into languages that may not (yet) 
have the linguistic resources to communicate those, “the moment you begin to talk about even translating into a language 
that the subject, the participant understands, you find that most words do not exist here……..so there is a problem of the 
concepts,”  Interview with KEMRI. 
 10 
For the women, the prospect of free health care is perceived as a major benefit of participating in the 
research; “I agreed because when I am sick they help me a lot and when my immunity is down they 
will also help me.”49  However, wider issues of benefit sharing with the Majengo participants have 
only been raised more recently,50 in the context of advances regarding benefit sharing in cases of 
non-human genetics, and following publicity regarding an alleged dispute between researchers from 
the Universities of Oxford and Nairobi over a patent application related to the HIV vaccine.51  This 
dispute was resolved after “intense” negotiations,52 which resulted in a new Memorandum of 
Understanding between the parties.  Although this provides that the collaborators will be joint 
applicants for, and owners of rights, titles and interests of inventions and/or patents arising from the 
research, and that research benefits will be shared equally between them,53 it does not mention how 
the researchers would compensate the Majengo women who have provided so many of the resources 
leading to the vaccine development. 54 
 
Traditionally, donors of samples used for scientific research do not have a stake in future benefits, 
except generic benefits such as medical progress. This is why most informed consent forms include a 
brief section which explains to the potential participant that no financial or other gains can be 
expected from taking part in this research. However, this traditional handling of resource samples has 
been increasingly criticised in the context of potential exploitation of research participants in 
developing countries.55 If medical progress is achieved mostly to the benefit of populations in 
research funder countries rather than the countries from where research participants are drawn, an 
equity problem occurs. To remedy this, the issue of benefit sharing has to be considered. 
 
Their lack of involvement in decision-making does not necessarily mean that the women were not 
interested in sharing benefits derived from the research involving information obtained from them. 
According to some media reports, the women have indeed raised issues related to benefit sharing.56  
 
The question of how those who provide human genetic resources for scientific research might be 
included in negotiations and decision-making about benefit sharing is discussed in more detail in 
subsequent sections. 
 
                                                 
49
 Interviews with Majengo participants. 
50
 See Pamela Andanda,  ‘A golden chance for medical ethics in Kenya,’ June 2004 Sci.Dev.Net 
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IV. Ethical issues/concerns 
Conducting research involving human genetic resources obtained from participants drawn from a 
community such as Majengo, which relies on collaboration between researchers from a variety of 
countries including developing countries such as Kenya, raises a number of ethical issues and 
concerns.  Although the HIV vaccine trial was halted in 2004, more studies are currently being 
conducted, so these issues remain live, and pressing.  The most significant ethical issues in the 
Majengo case are related to negotiation and consent, the vulnerability of the research subjects, and 
benefit sharing. 
 
Determining what qualifies as a benefit, in the context of benefit sharing, in which participants in 
such studies can meaningfully share, particularly where there has been no tangible outcome is a 
daunting task.57  In this case the trial vaccine developed out of the studies has not proved successful, 
but the researchers, their institutions, and arguably the whole field of related science and medicine 
have gained considerably from the ongoing studies in terms of for example, techniques of developing 
DNA based vaccine, lessons in immunology, technology transfer, and patents for vaccine 
development processes58  There are other related concerns: Who should benefit from the outcome of 
these studies; the community members or the collaborating country as a whole?  Who determines the 
nature of any benefits to be shared with the participants or wider beneficiaries in such cases? What 
criteria are used in determining the nature of those benefits? What prompts participants to give their 
consent to participate in studies involving human genetic research, and how might these be affected 
by benefit sharing negotiations and arrangements? The last question is closely related to ongoing 
debates about exploitation versus undue inducement of participants. Each of these concerns is 
discussed below.  
 
IV. i. What prompts participants to give their consent to participate in studies involving human 
genetic research, and how might these be affected by benefit sharing negotiations and 
arrangements? 
 
Genetic research usually proceeds on the basis that the donors give their informed consent 
altruistically.59 This is typified by one of the Majengo participants who said, “They can get a cure 
from my blood and it can help the whole world.  So that is why I gave myself.”60 However, the 
ability of participants to make free and informed decisions to participate in human genetic research 
presents unique challenges insofar as “the purposes for which the data and biological samples are 
collected and the uses for which they may be employed will often only be known in a very general 
manner…”.61  Interestingly, Kenya’s Guidelines on HIV vaccines research do address this issue, but 
somewhat superficially. Paragraph 7.3 on the informed consent process simply provides that “no 
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biological material transfer shall be done without informed consent of the trial participants.”62 
However, giving one’s informed consent to the transfer of material for, potentially, commercial 
development, is not equivalent to actually being involved in the negotiations where issues such as the 
sharing of potential benefits may be determined. As outlined in the various guidelines discussed so 
far, it is clear that research participants should be given an opportunity to be involved in any such 
negotiation processes, but this provision does not seem to address this concern.  In common with 
many developing countries Kenya does not have the capacity for scientific analysis of all of the 
samples the studies will collect, which means that “in most cases…the samples or the materials are 
taken out of the country,”…“In most cases in our countries when these materials are gone we never 
get to know what happens to these things.”  “The individual will never get to know what happened to 
the samples or what became of the whole study.  So issues of benefit are limited to the bus 
fare…..And here we also have this problem of drawing the line between benefit and inducement, 
benefit and coercion.”63  
  
A common concern related to motivation to participate in genetic research is the issue of whether 
offering monetary compensation to research participants is an inducement which threatens the very 
possibility of voluntary informed consent.64 An alternative of compensation for all DNA donors has 
been proposed. 65  However, this raises the same ethical and practical problem of inducements that 
could persuade those who otherwise would not be inclined to donate, particularly those in financial 
distress. For those who need to undertake commercial sex work in order to ensure their economic 
survival, this would have to be a very real consideration. 
 
[P]overty is a great factor and sometimes militates against voluntary consent.66 
 
 UNESCO’s Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights notes that “Benefits should not constitute 
improper inducements to participate in research.”67 The Kenyan Guidelines on HIV vaccines research 
explicitly recognise this problem (paragraph 7.3) and clearly state that “monetary benefit could be an 
inducement for participation in a trial and thus would negate free consent.” 
 
Grady has suggested that research participants volunteer and sacrifice their time and effort in order to 
support the generation of knowledge that is helpful to the whole society, with little or uncertain 
benefit for themselves, and therefore “rather than being an inducement, money to reimburse research 
participants for their expenses and compensate them in some way for their time and effort may be a 
demonstration of respect and appreciation for these generous individuals.”68 “You see, this ‘road 
job’, we don’t do it because we like it, there is a reason, and if I could get other things apart from…69  
Chambers’ response to Grady is that “monetary compensation nullifies our appreciation…” since, 
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“…such compensation transforms the research subject into a commodity.”70 Grady’s position is that a 
participant’s decision may be subject to many influences and money may be just one of them.71  
 
It has also been suggested that payments should be evaluated in the light of the broader research 
context because “payments are ethical only in the context of a comprehensive and effective system of 
research protections”.72 
 
Three practical problems have been identified in creating a rule at the outset that financial 
compensation should be paid to participants:73 First, university scientists would be prohibited from 
participating in drug discovery based on genomic research due to the financial situation of most 
universities that do not have funds to pay at the outset; second, “the idea of benefit sharing 
presupposes that there are some benefits and becomes void if no benefit accrues…” and third, 
“…fewer projects would move to actual clinical testing if projects taken over from academic groups 
had significant financial commitments attached.”  
 
The practical problems arising from financial compensation may therefore need to be actively 
addressed by the negotiating parties. 
   
A helpful precedent has already been set for such cases by the developments in the Canadian 
province of Newfoundland and Labrador where there is a requirement for benefit sharing protocols to 
be included in studies involving human genetics. The Province introduced legislation to establish a 
Provincial Health Research Ethics Board (PHREB) to review all genetic studies conducted in the 
province. Apart from this, the recommended benefit-sharing protocol requires the establishment of a 
Standing Committee on Human Genetic Research (SCHGR), “that would operate at arms-length 
from, but parallel to, the PHREB”. The model further requires “all research projects utilizing the 
Newfoundland genome…to submit a benefit-sharing proposal with supporting rationale to the 
SCHRG”. The proposal in this regard should indicate how the economic benefits derived from the 
study will be shared. This may take the form of “an agreement in principle to bring forward a detailed 
plan if and when commercial opportunities arise.”74   
 
The rationale of the Canadian proposal is to ensure that communities do not “relinquish a claim to 
future economic benefits at the outset either because the project is initiated in the public sector, or 
because the possibility of commercialization seems remote.”75 This precedent could be used in other 
jurisdictions that are considering introducing similar measures.  
 
Apart from the issue of paying monetary compensation to research participants, there is a wide 
literature which has considered other motives that encourage participants and other interested parties 
to become involved in genetic studies. The motives that are often more relevant for research 
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participants include self-interest in treatment,76 altruism or an obligation to act for the good of 
others.77  “[I agreed] because I did not have money to go to hospital so if they gave me medicine…I 
thought it was better and my body can help other people by the research.”78  These diverse interests 
show that “the patient community may not want a financial return, instead preferring to have an 
influence on access, pricing, and the terms guiding ownership and control of downstream 
developments”.79 These sentiments have indeed been reported in the media amongst the Majengo 
women: 
 
It is poverty which has pushed us into this dangerous business, and if the vaccine is sold we 
might not benefit. You see we cannot even afford to treat minor infections, so how will we 
afford the vaccine. The vaccine can only benefit us and other people if it is given free or at 
affordable prices.80 
 
This clearly resonates with the concerns demonstrated in the UNESCO and HUGO guidelines 
discussed in section 11, that all of humanity should benefit from any such advances. This is an 
important factor that policy development in the benefit sharing context should take into account, as 
any such shared concerns could only support and strengthen such policy developments. 
 
As has been indicated above, the Majengo women were not involved, either individually or 
collectively in the negotiation process, and the prospects of getting any more than standard care 
benefits from the ongoing research were not discussed with them before they gave their consent to 
participate; “I did not expect money or such things, just treatment.”81 This situation is not surprising 
because discussions about benefit sharing to date have tended to be limited to large scale national 
projects.82 This does not however imply that concerted efforts should not be made to encourage 
discussions on benefit sharing in such circumstances.  
 
“Is there any way you can help us to fend for ourselves and get on in life like others; that 
would be good.”83 
 
 
IV. ii. What qualifies as a benefit? And who decides? 
In addition to the national and international legal instruments and other Declarations discussed in 
section 11, much current literature and a variety of further ethical guidelines recognise the possibility 
of sharing both the financial and non-financial benefits of genetic research with the communities that 
participate. There is also an emphasis upon properly negotiating the terms of any such agreements. 
  
Principle 30 of the Declaration of Helsinki appears to identify as a benefit an assurance of access to 
the best proven prophylactic, diagnostic and therapeutic methods identified by the study.84 It has 
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however been suggested that this Principle should be revised to ensure that “the extent of sponsors’ 
financial obligations must be reconciled in light of their potential profits from the research…” and 
“…these obligations should be negotiated and clarified between sponsors and hosts before the 
research is begun, specified in the consent process, and reviewed by a local research ethics board.”85 
The obligation to negotiate the nature of any benefits as well as the manner of sharing such benefits 
can be included in the sponsors’ and researchers’ obligations for consideration in this regard. 
 
According to the Human Genome Organisation (HUGO) Ethics Committee, possible benefits to be 
shared may include “technology transfer, local training, joint ventures, provision of health care or of 
information infrastructure, reimbursement of costs, or the possible use of a percentage of any 
royalties for humanitarian purposes.”86  Its Statement on Benefit-Sharing confirms that “a benefit is 
not identical with profit in the monetary or economic sense [and]… determining a benefit depends on 
needs, values, priorities and cultural expectations.”87 
 
UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights itemises the following similar 
forms that benefits might take within ‘society as a whole’: 
 
(a) special and sustainable assistance to, and acknowledgement of, the persons and groups that 
have taken part in the research; 
(b) access to quality health care; 
(c) provision of new diagnostic and therapeutic modalities or products stemming from research; 
(d) support for health services; 
(e) access to scientific and technological knowledge; 
(f) capacity-building facilities for research purposes;88 
 
Article 21(4) provides that the terms for collaboration and agreement on the benefits of research 
should be established with equal participation by parties to the negotiation. This essentially means 
that all parties should be involved in determining the nature of the benefits to be shared. 
 
The above guidelines are helpful in determining the nature of potential benefits but are also clear that 
it is incumbent on the negotiating parties to contextualize these guidelines and determine the most 
suitable types of benefit to be shared with the participants. Berg argues that “improved understanding 
of disease processes and a potential for new therapeutic modalities are themselves benefits.”89 In the 
Majengo case, the researchers have certainly benefited and continue to benefit by improving their 
understanding of HIV/AIDS90  Berg’s argument in support of benefit sharing is that “important 
progress resulting from research on samples from a small number of people ‘personalizes’ the 
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progress in a way that by itself makes it reasonable to consider benefit sharing”.91  This is a powerful 
argument in the Majengo context, echoed by the claim that “most people think that our commercial 
sex workers have been exploited.  They have been used and in the end there was not benefit from 
that. Society may benefit from the alleged resistance….we can say the whole world will benefit, but 
is that enough to these ladies who have been attending the clinic since 1985?”92 
 
 
IV. iii. Who should benefit from the outcomes of these studies? 
The HUGO Statement on Benefit-Sharing recommends that profit-making endeavours can consider 
donating “a percentage of the net profits (after taxes) to the health care infrastructure or for vaccines, 
tests, drugs, and treatments, or, to local, national and international humanitarian efforts.”93  It has also 
been argued that “if profit results from genomic research on a whole population, the recipient of 
shared benefits should be the whole population.”94  
  
There is however, as we have seen, no well founded legal argument in support of either paying 
individual donors of genetic material for their donation, or making their donation the basis of sharing 
benefits derived from research using such material.  This is currently a matter for each legal system 
to regulate, but the common position in most jurisdictions is that “a thing which the legal system does 
not recognize as susceptible to ownership (a thing which is res extra commercium) will not be 
deemed as an asset in that legal system.”95 The underlying consideration in this regard is that the 
donors of samples which are used for genomic research “cannot have a right similar to that based on 
intellectual property or patent acts. Their body has simply synthesized a compound based on 
hereditary instructions passed on from the parents.”96 The position on how benefits should be shared 
is succinctly put forth by Berg: 
 
If a person’s DNA becomes ‘valuable’, it would be because of something that researchers have 
done with it or because of some pre-existing knowledge attained by the work of other scientists 
at an earlier stage. The people who make a person’s DNA sample valuable must have some 
stake in it, a right that is more like that of a holder of intellectual property than any right that 
the donor of the sample could claim. If industry has a duty to pay, the rights of the scientists 
that have made a sample valuable may exceed those of a person who has merely donated 
DNA.97 
 
The above position represents the traditional assumption that “the donors of genetic material used in 
research act altruistically and are entitled to no property rights or direct benefit-sharing in the fruits of 
the research.”98 This assumption is however “under assault from several directions simultaneously.”99 
This is evident from the series of ethics guidelines that have been referred to in this report. The result 
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is that “the legal and ethical foundation for not assigning property rights to DNA donors, or at least 
recognizing an obligation for benefit-sharing based on quasi-property rights, is now suspect.”100   
 
IV. iv. Vulnerability 
Individuals and communities who are recognised as being particularly vulnerable to harm are subject 
to extra protection when being considered for inclusion in research in order to protect them from 
exploitation: 
 
Exploitation can be defined as the act of taking unfair advantage of another party to serve 
one’s own interests.101 
 
It has been argued that the context in which vulnerability is currently used has rendered almost all 
research participants vulnerable to such an extent that “the concept has become too nebulous to be 
meaningful”.102 There is indeed ambiguity regarding “what constitutes a community in need of 
protection, disagreements about multiculturalism and uncertainty as to what protections should 
be”.103 However, the international ethical guidelines we have considered are almost unanimous in 
their concern for vulnerable research participants. 
 
Article 8 of the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights states that “Individuals and 
groups of special vulnerability should be protected”. The Declaration of Helsinki addresses the 
subject in more detail: 
 
Medical research is subject to ethical standards that promote respect for all human beings 
and protect their health and rights. Some research populations are vulnerable and need 
special protection. The particular needs of the economically and medically disadvantaged 
must be recognized. Special attention is also required for those who cannot give or refuse 
consent for themselves, for those who may be subject to giving consent under duress, for 
those who will not benefit personally from the research and for those for whom the research 
is combined with care.104 
 
Additionally it notes: 
 
The physician may combine medical research with medical care, only to the extent that 
the research is justified by its potential prophylactic, diagnostic or therapeutic value. 
When medical research is combined with medical care, additional standards apply to 
protect the patients who are research subjects.105 
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It is already clear from the foregoing discussions that these principles would apply to the Majengo 
participants.  The CIOMS Guidelines are more specific about who is vulnerable, and state that: 
 
…groups or classes [that] may also be considered vulnerable…include ………poor people 
and the unemployed…some ethnic and racial minority groups, homeless persons…refugees 
or displaced persons…patients with incurable disease, individuals who are politically 
powerless, and members of communities unfamiliar with modern medical concepts. To the 
extent that these and other classes of people have attributes resembling those of classes 
identified as vulnerable, the need for special protection of their rights and welfare should be 
reviewed and applied, where relevant.106 
 
Again it is clear that the Majengo women fall under this description. KEMRI has “rules about the use 
of vulnerable populations”, and works to ensure that research is not carried out in a more vulnerable 
population, if a less vulnerable one could be chosen.107 It seems generally accepted that in the 
Majengo case “the research could not be carried out equally well with less vulnerable subjects”.108 
But it has been noted that this is a “group which would normally be excluded [from participation in 
research] under normal ethical rules”.109  .The question of the Majengo participants’ vulnerability 
therefore remains central to an examination of ethical issues related to this case, particularly the 
ethical justification for benefit sharing. 
 
Guiding Point 7 of the UNAIDS guidance document states that vulnerability should not only be 
assessed on an economic basis but that “it is more useful to identify the particular aspects of a social 
context that create conditions for exploitation or increased vulnerability for the pool of participants 
that has been selected.”110  In the Majengo case, the women are vulnerable for multiple reasons due 
to their occupation, poor economic conditions and dependence on the clinic for their health care 
needs. 
 
The individual women in this case identify themselves as belonging to a group of commercial sex 
workers.  They in fact also belong to this group by virtue of their very participation in the study; 
“...once they come to Majengo clinic one of the things we insist on is that they must accept and 
acknowledge that they are sex workers.  That was our condition.” 111  The Majengo participants 
themselves share this understanding, “I have brought some [friends] already, those I know who do 
this prostitution job.  But there are others who like coming and they don’t do that job because they 
know of the benefits they can get; but those ones are not allowed at all, those like us…are the ones 
who come to the Clinic”.112 Classifying a group as a community is not easy, particularly where 
genetic research is concerned, as the research focuses on shared genetic characteristics rather than 
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social and economic ones.113  However, Grady’s proposed definition of ‘community’ is helpful in the 
context of the Majengo case: 
 
a group or aggregate of people who interact with each other, are interdependent, and have 
something in common (whether it be ancestry, place of inhabitancy, culture, behaviors, or special 
interests), and who understand or define themselves to some extent as belonging to this group.114  
 
Significantly, the UNAIDS guidance also specifically states that the “social and legal marginalization 
of groups from which participants might be drawn, eg…..sex workers”… “can increase the nature 
and level of risk of harm to participants”.115  It is important to note here that prostitution is a criminal 
offence in Kenya.  The UNAIDS guidance is clear that “Persons who engage in illegal or socially 
stigmatized activities are vulnerable to undue influence and threats presented by possible breaches of 
confidentiality…such persons include sex workers”. And it considers that a vulnerable person’s legal 
or social status may impact on their ability to provide informed consent.116  The UNAIDS guidance 
also considers “governmental, institutional or social stigmatization or discrimination on the basis of 
HIV status” to be related to vulnerability,117 and the community are well aware of the associated risk 
of stigmatization from being involved in the study; “you may tell them but they are scared to come, 
and you see if they come here they are known to have ‘that sickness’.”118 
 
It has been noted that the question of vulnerability is even more pertinent here as the participants may 
be sick with HIV/AIDS; “where do you draw the distinction between participating as a research 
subject and somebody coming for treatment?” “We found out that some of them have been there for 
so long…so many years that issues of whether they are now patients undergoing treatment or the 
research has become completely confused”.119  This demonstrates that for vulnerable people, the 
provision of health care in return for participation can compound their vulnerabilities at the same 
time as it helps them. 
 
Some regulatory authorities are already considering setting out standards for research involving 
collectivities such as aboriginal groups and people infected with HIV.120 A very strong argument can 
certainly be made for considering the Majengo women as a multiply vulnerable community who are 
resistant to HIV, or at risk/infected with HIV (as some of them have seroconverted). A community 
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representative, as envisaged in Guiding Point 5 of the UNAIDS guidance document, might therefore 
be involved in negotiating additional benefits on behalf of the women.121  
 
 
 
V. Conclusions and The Way Forward 
 
“I did not expect money, just for my life to be better.”122 
 
Research on human genetic resources is an area that is growing rapidly and there is a lot of interest in 
this field while at the same time policies and regulations continue to develop. Such dynamic fields, as 
one of us has argued elsewhere, require a lot of vigilance and flexibility in addressing the issues that 
they raise.123 Flexibility can be achieved through regulatory negotiation with a view to creating an 
enabling environment where the rights of research participants are respected while at the same time 
substantial benefits are gained from research.124 
 
Kenya has very good legal and ethical frameworks that govern benefit sharing of non-human genetic 
resources. Perhaps it is high time the country also developed similar frameworks for human genetic 
resources. The existing ethical frameworks for human genetic resources tend to focus more on the 
protection of research participants against risks and the potential benefits that they should share 
receives inadequate emphasis and attention.  
 
Sheremeta and Knoppers have proposed the idea of sharing benefits with the donors of genetic 
materials as a way of fostering cooperation between developed and developing countries. Their 
argument is as follows: 
 
[I]f appropriately developed and applied to human population genetic research, a rational 
model of benefit-sharing can provide a mechanism that will enable cooperation between the 
developed world and the developing world. A relevant benefit sharing model can be readily 
developed through the innovative adaptation of the benefit sharing provisions contained in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and informed by declaratory statements, ethical 
guidelines, and professional codes of conduct. Such a model can recognize the relative 
importance of intellectual property protection and the principles of distributing [sic] justice and 
equity.125  
 
The above argument makes sense even from a legal perspective, and irrespective of the jurisprudence 
that courts, particularly in the United States, have developed with regard to tissue donor’s interests in 
their donated samples, holding that “the research participant’s property right in blood and tissue 
                                                 
121
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samples…evaporates once the sample is voluntarily given to a third party” on the basis that “at the 
core, these were donations to research without any contemporaneous expectations of return”.126 
Marchant argues that the effect of this decision would make more genetic donors insist on having a 
say in the patenting of discoveries resulting from research using their DNA and how those patents 
will be administered. He concludes that “it does not matter whether the law automatically provides 
property rights in one’s DNA if donors will insist on such rights as contractual matter.”127 This 
confirms that Sheremeta and Knopper’s argument is plausible. It also confirms that there are quite a 
number of lessons that can be drawn from frameworks for benefit sharing in the context of non-
human genetic resources where such contractual agreements are currently used to foster benefit 
sharing. A supportable rationale for benefit sharing in human genetic resources can be drawn from 
international human rights law, declaratory statements on the human genome, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the Bonn Guidelines.128 
 
There is a lot of international interest in and commitment to taking effective measures to promote the 
equitable sharing of benefits from the use of human genetic resources. It is clear that these would be 
welcome in Kenya, particularly to support improvements in the ethical review process.129 The ethical 
and policy issues that arise from this case can significantly inform the process of developing an 
appropriate framework for human genetic studies, both in Kenya and on the wider international stage. 
  
The rationale for benefit sharing in human genetic resources that has been discussed in this report 
needs to be explored further to develop a model for benefit sharing with communities such as the 
Majengo women. Clear guidelines are also needed specifically for benefit sharing with the Majengo 
women who have never been included in the negotiation process.130 These models can be developed 
by drawing lessons from the non-human genetic resource frameworks such as the CBD. This requires 
the research community to “make a concerted effort in cooperation with national governments to 
devise a legally binding framework for sharing the benefits of human genetics research that is based 
on equity, justice, and the spirit of the convention.”131 
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129
 Interview with MoH. 
130
 Pamela Andanda, ‘A golden chance for medical ethics in Kenya’, Science and Development Network (June 2004). 
Available at http://www.scidev.net/content/opinions/eng/a-golden-chance-for-medical-ethics-in-kenya.cfm   
131
 Doris Schroeder, Miltos Ladikas, Udo Schuklenk, Carolina Lasén Diáz, Anita Kleinsmidt, Fatima Alvarez-Castillo 
and Dafna Feinholz, ‘Sharing the benefits of genetic research,’ 
 BMJ 331 (2005) 1351-1352, p.1352. 
 
 
 
 22 
Bibliography  
 
Journal articles 
Ball TB, Ji H, Kimani J, McLaren P, Marlin C, Hill AV, Plummer FA. ‘Polymorphisms in IRF-1 
associated with resistance to HIV-1 infection in highly exposed uninfected Kenyan sex workers,’ 
AIDS. 2007 May 31; 21(9):1091-1101. 
 
Berg K, ‘The ethics of benefit-sharing,’ Clinical Genetics 59 (2001) 240–43. 
 
Chambers T, ‘Participation as Commodity, Participation as Gift,’ American Journal of Bioethics 1/2 
(2001) p.48. 
 
Davis DS, ‘Groups, Communities, and Contested Identities in Genetic Research,’ Hastings Center 
Report 30/6 (2000) 38-45. 
 
Dresser R, ‘Payments to Research Participants: The Importance of Context,’ American Journal of 
Bioethics 1/2 (2001) p.47. 
 
Fang G, Kuiken C, Weiser B, Rowland-Jones S, Plummer F, Chen CH, Kaul R, Anzala AO, Bwayo 
J, Kimani J, Philpott SM, Kitchen C, Sinsheimer JS, Gaschen B, Lang D, Shi B, Kemal KS, Rostron 
T, Brunner C, Beddows S, Sattenau Q, Paxinos E, Oyugi J, Burger H. ‘Long-term survivors in 
Nairobi: complete HIV-1 RNA sequences and immunogenetic associations,’ J Infect Dis. 2004 Aug 
15;190(4):697-701. Epub 2004 Jul 13. 
 
Fowke KR, Nagelkerke NJ, Kimani J, Simonsen JN, Anzala AO, Bwayo JJ, MacDonald KS, Ngugi 
EN, Plummer FA. ‘Resistance to HIV-1 infection among persistently seronegative prostitutes in 
Nairobi, Kenya,’ Lancet 1996 Nov 16; 348 (9038):1347-51. 
 
Fowke KR, Dong T, Rowland-Jones SL, Oyugi J, Rutherford WJ, Kimani J, Krausa P, Bwayo J, 
Simonsen JN, Shearer GM, Plummer FA. ‘HIV type 1 resistance in Kenyan sex workers is not 
associated with altered cellular susceptibility to HIV type 1 infection or enhanced beta-chemokine 
production,’ AIDS Res Hum Retroviruses. 1998 Nov 20; 14(17):1521-30. 
 
Fowke KR, Kaul R, Rosenthal KL, Oyugi J, Kimani J, Rutherford WJ, Nagelkerke NJ, Ball TB, 
Bwayo JJ, Simonsen JN, Shearer GM, Plummer FA. ‘HIV-1-specific cellular immune responses 
among HIV-1-resistant sex workers,’ Immunol Cell Biol. 2000 Dec; 78(6):586-95. 
 
Godard B, Schmidtke J, Cassiman J and Ayme S, ‘Data storage and DNA banking for biomedical 
research: informed consent, confidentiality, quality issues, ownership, return of benefits. A 
professional perspective,’ European Journal of Human Genetics 11/2 (2003) S88–S122. 
 
Grady C, ‘Money for Research Participation: Does it Jeopardize Informed consent?’ American 
Journal of Bioethics 1/2 (2001) 40-44. 
 
 23 
Jordan CM, and Price CJ, ‘First Moore, then Hecht: Isn’t it Time we Recognise a Property Interest in 
Tissues, Cells and Gametes? Real Prop. Prob. & TR. J 37/151 (2002) 167-171. Cited in Marchant op 
cit note 56. 
 
Ji H, Ball TB, Kimani J, Plummer FA. ‘Novel interferon regulatory factor-1 polymorphisms in a 
Kenyan population revealed by complete gene sequencing,’ J Hum Genet. 2004; 49(10):528-35. 
Epub 2004 Sep 17. 
 
Kaul R, Rowland-Jones SL, Kimani J, Dong T, Yang HB, Kiama P, Rostron T, Njagi E, Bwayo JJ, 
MacDonald KS, McMichael AJ, Plummer FA. ‘Late seroconversion in HIV-resistant Nairobi 
prostitutes despite pre-existing HIV-specific CD8+ responses,’ J Clin Invest. 2001 Feb; 107(3):341-
9. 
 
Kaul R, Dong T, Plummer FA, Kimani J, Rostron T, Kiama P, Njagi E, Irungu E, Farah B, Oyugi J, 
Chakraborty R, MacDonald KS, Bwayo JJ, McMichael A, Rowland-Jones SL. ‘CD8(+) lymphocytes 
respond to different HIV epitopes in seronegative and infected subjects,’ J Clin Invest. 2001 May; 
107(10):1303- 10. 
 
 
Kaul R, Rowland-Jones SL, Kimani J, Fowke K, Dong T, Kiama P, Rutherford J, Njagi E, Mwangi 
F, Rostron T, Onyango J, Oyugi J, MacDonald KS, Bwayo JJ, Plummer FA. ‘New insights into HIV-
1 specific cytotoxic T-lymphocyte responses in exposed, persistently seronegative Kenyan sex 
workers,’ Immunol Lett. 2001 Nov 1; 79(1-2):3-13, p.3 
 
Levine C, Faden R, Grady C, Hammerschmidt D, Eckenwiler L Sugarman J, ‘The Limitations of 
“Vulnerability” as a Protection for Human Research Participants,’ The American Journal of Bioethics  
4/3 (2004) 44–49. 
 
Macpherson CC, ‘Research Sponsors Duties to Developing World Host Nations: The Ongoing WMA 
Discussion of Possible Revisions To the 2000 Declaration of Helsinki (Paragraph 30),’ Developing 
World Bioethics 4/2(2004) 173-175. 
 
Marchant GE, ‘Property Rights and Benefit-Sharing for DNA Donors,’ Jurimetrics 45 (2005) 153-
178. 
 
Merz JF, Magnus D, Cho MK, and Caplan AL, ‘Protecting Subjects’ Interests in Genetics Research,’ 
Am. J. Hum. Genet. 70 (2002) 965–971. 
 
Pullman D, Latus A, ‘Benefit Sharing in Smaller Markets: The Case of Newfoundland and 
Labrador,’ Community Genet 6 (2003) 178-181. 
 
Rowland-Jones SL, Dong T, Fowke KR, Kimani J, Krausa P, Newell H, Blanchard T, Ariyoshi K, 
Oyugi J, Ngugi E, Bwayo J, MacDonald KS, McMichael AJ, Plummer FA. ‘Cytotoxic T cell 
responses to multiple conserved HIV epitopes in HIV-resistant prostitutes in Nairobi,’ J Clin Invest. 
1998 Nov 1; 102(9):1758-65. 
 
 24 
Rowland–Jones S, Dong T, Krausa P, Sutton J, Newell H, Ariyoshi K, Gotch F, Sabally S, Corrah T, 
Kimani J, MacDonald K, Plummer F, Ndinya-Achola J, Whittle H, McMichael A. ‘The role of 
cytotoxic T-cells in HIV infection,’  Dev Biol Stand. 1998; 92:209-14. 
 
Schroeder D, Ladikas M, Schuklenk U, Diáz CL, Kleinsmidt A, Alvarez-Castillo F and Feinholz D, 
‘Sharing the benefits of genetic research,’ BMJ 331 (2005) 1351-1352. 
 
Schroeder D, and Diáz CL, ‘Sharing the Benefits of Genetic Resources: From Biodiversity to Human 
Genetics,’ Developing World Bioethics, Vol. 6, No. 3, December 2006. 
 
Sheremeta L, and Knoppers BM, ‘Beyond the rhetoric: population genetics and benefit-sharing,’ 
Health Law Journal 11 (2003) 89-117. 
 
Sheremeta L, ‘Population Genetic Studies: Is there an Emerging Legal Obligation to Share Benefits?’ 
Health Law Review 12/1 (2003) 36-38. 
 
Weijer C, Goldsand G, Emanuel E, ‘Protecting communities in research: current guidelines and 
limits of extrapolation,’ Nature Genetics 23 (1999) 275-280. 
 
Weisman J, ‘Organs as assets,’ Israel Law Review 27/4 (1993) 610-623. 
 
Books 
Andanda P, The Law & Regulation of Clinical Research: Interplay with Public Policy and Bioethics 
(Nairobi: Focus Publishers Ltd, 2006). 
 
Grady C, The Search for an AIDS Vaccine: Ethical Issues in the Development and Testing of a 
Preventive HIV Vaccine (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). 
 
OECD, Creation and Governance of Human Genetic Research Databases (OECD Publishing, 2006). 
 
Macklin R.  Double Standards in Medical Research in Developing Countries (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
 
Wertheimer A. Exploitation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).  
 
 
 
Opinion articles 
Pamela Andanda, ‘A golden chance for medical ethics in Kenya,’ Science and Development Network 
(June 2004). Available at http://www.scidev.net/content/opinions/eng/a-golden-chance-for-medical-
ethics-in-kenya.cfm 
 
  
Newspaper and other media sources, arranged by date  
The Associated Press, ‘Nairobi Prostitutes may hold key to AIDS Vaccine,’ CNN, 25 October 1997. 
 
 25 
Hilary Bower, ‘Science:  New hope; African prostitutes who seem to have developed immunity to 
HIV have pointed an Oxford research team in the direction of a vaccine – and not only for the 
prosperous,’ The Independent (London) November 29 1998. 
 
Anne-christine d'Adesky and Richard Jeffreys, ‘The African Connection. Sex workers provide clues 
for a vaccine,’ HIV+ 3, March 1999 available at  
http://www.aidsinfonyc.org/hivplus/issue3/ahead/african.html 
 
Arthur Okwemba, ‘A History of Exploitation,’ Daily Nation, 15 July 2000. 
 
Mark Turner, ‘Universities’ rift over Aids vaccine defused,’ Financial Times, October 23 2000. 
 
‘Kenyan AIDS Scientists Win Recognition Battle,’ Daily Nation, 30 August 2001. 
 
Richard Jeffreys, ‘Riddle Women: Reports of Progress Toward Understanding How Some People 
Appear to Fight Off HIV,’ November 2001, at www.thebody.com/content/art1571.html   
 
‘The Kenya AIDS Vaccine Initiative: challenges and achievements,’ Newsletter of the African AIDS 
Vaccine Programme, Issue 2, 2002. 
 
Michael Specter, ‘The vaccine - Has the race to save Africa from aids put Western science at odds 
with Western ethics?’ The New Yorker, February 3, 2003 
 
John Carlin, ‘Hope for Aids cure as prostitutes defy virus in the slums,’ The Observer, November 23, 
2003. 
 
Arthur Okwemba, ‘AIDS Vaccine fails crucial test’, Daily Nation, February 9 2004. 
 
Michael Waldholz, ‘AIDS Vaccine Disappoints in Tests: Experimental Drug Failed To Show Robust 
Response in Human Immune System,’ Wall Street Journal, September 3, 2004. 
 
Guidelines & Policy documents 
HUGO Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Committee Report to HUGO Council. Statement on the 
Principled Conduct of Genetics Research, 1996. 
 
UNESCO, Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 1997 
 
HUGO Ethics Committee. Statement on Benefit-Sharing, April 9 2000. 
 
World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects, 2000. 
 
UNAIDS. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) - Ethical Considerations 
in HIV Preventive Vaccine Research, Geneva, May 2000, Switzerland. 
 
 26 
Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), International Ethical 
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, “International Instruments and 
Guidelines,” 2002. 
 
UNESCO, International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, 2003. 
 
Ministry of Health. Kenya National Guidelines for Research and Development of HIV/AIDS 
Vaccines, March 2005. 
 
UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 2005. 
 
UNAIDS/WHO AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2006 
 
 
Conventions 
United Nations, International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1976. 
 
Regulations 
The Environmental Management and Co-ordination (Conservation of Biological Diversity and 
Resources, Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing) Regulations, 2006 (Kenya). 
 
Reports 
Simm K, Benefit Sharing Frameworks – Justifications for and against benefit sharing in human 
genetic research. A Report for Genbenefit, 2007, available at www.uclan.ac.uk/genbenefit 
 
Simm K, Benefit Sharing Regulations.  A Review for GenBenefit, 2007, available at 
www.uclan.ac.uk/genbenefit  
 
  
